Commentary

Book Review
The Kashmir Problem: A Historical Survey (1947-1966)
By Dr A. Khan
Chicago, IL

Since 1947, the dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir has flared into outbreaks of undeclared wars between two members of the British Commonwealth. In The Kashmir Problem: A Historical Survey (1947-1966), Alastair Lambpresents a historical perspective, spanned over nine chapters, of the tragic dispute between the two successors to British Raj in the Indian subcontinent. The author has served as a Senior Fellow in the Institute of Advanced Studies of the Australian National University.
Lamb examines the historical events that led to a Muslim majority's entering the age of independence under the leadership of a Hindu ruler. In 1846, the British sold the Valley of Kashmir - which had been under Islamic governance for five centuries - to a Hindu. Kashmir thus became a princely state - an independent state recognizing British paramountcy – and herein, argues the author, lay the crux of the problem. A major flaw in the British partition plan was its failure to secure settlements for three of the larger princely states by the time the actual transfer of power took place. India gained possession of one through a plebiscite (case of Junagarh), and of a second through an economic blockade followed by military occupation (case of Hyderabad state). In the case of Kashmir, India accepted the Hindu maharaja's accession without prior reference to his predominantly Muslim subjects - and so inflamed a dangerously sensitive situation.
The author expounds on the history of the two decades that followed partition of British India, and observes that from a rational point of view, based on a study of the culture and economy of the region, there can be little doubt that a scheme for the partition of the Indian subcontinent should have awarded the greater part of Kashmir and Jammu State to Pakistan. He also quotes, the Indian apologists, who maintain that this is an ideological battle between the Islamic state of Pakistan (followers of two-nation theory) and the modem secular state of India (followers of one-nation theory).
In the first chapter (The Indian Princely States, Paramountcy and Partition), reflecting on the background of partition of British India, the author observes: “In one sense the Kashmir problem can be seen as a consequence of the British failure to find a satisfactory method for the integration of the Princely States into the independent India and Pakistan which succeeded the British Raj. There were 562 Princely States in British India by the time of the transfer of power, and they cover over one-third of the total area of the Indian Empire. Some States were tiny, controlling but a few acres of land, others are large indeed. Hyderabad and Kashmir, the most extensive of all the States…The partition of British India into independent India and Pakistan was an extremely complicated process for which the British had made absolutely no preparation…the Kashmir dispute was a direct consequence of the inefficiency with which the process of partition in the Indian subcontinent was prepared and executed.”
Discussing the issue of plebiscite in the princely states, the author observes: “In Junagadh, where a plebiscite has suited the Indian policy, a plebiscite has been held; in Kashmir, where a plebiscite has not suited Indian policy, a plebiscite has not been held. In Hyderabad, where the use of military force by India has been expedient, so that force has been declared to be morally justified. By the same token, in Kashmir where the use of Pakistani military force has not suited Indian policy, so also has it been condemned on moral grounds. The great difference between Kashmir and the other two regions, Junagadh and Hyderabad, lies in the fact that Kashmir alone is in direct territorial contact with both India and Pakistan. Only here has Pakistan been in a position to offer any effective opposition to the Indian 'one-nation' outlook. Hence Kashmir has become a battlefield where Junagadh and Hyderabad have not…”
In the second chapter (Kashmir State and the Establishment of Dogra Rule), expounding on Pakistan’s claim to Kashmir, the author states: “…This brief survey of the population, economy and geography of Kashmir contains within it the main grounds for the Pakistani claim to Kashmir: and these merit summary. First: the State of Jammu and Kashmir was a region with an overwhelming Muslim majority contiguous to the Muslim majority region of the Panjab which became part of Pakistan. Second: the economy of Jammu & and Kashmir State was bound up with Pakistan. Its best communication with the outside world lay through Pakistan, and this was the route taken by the bulk of its exports. Third: the waters of the Indus, Jhelum and Chenab, all of which flowed through Kashmir territory, were vital to the agricultural life of Pakistan…From a strictly rational point of view, based on a study of the culture and the economy of the region, there can be little doubt that a scheme for the partition of the Indian subcontinent such as was devised in 1947 should have awarded the greater part of Kashmir and Junagarh State to Pakistan.”
In chapter three (Partition and the Accession Crisis, 1947), examining the role of Lord Mountbatten, the last viceroy of British India, the authors states: “MountbattennevergotonwithJinnahandresented, soitseems,Jinnah’s frustrationofhisambitiontobethefirst Governor General of both India and Pakistan. His immediate reaction to the crisis, inthese circumstances, was to see how he could stop what he regarded as Jinnah's game. By obtaining the Maharaja's accession to India he secured both a right for Indian troops to intervene and a means for preventing intervention by the regular forces of Pakistan…On the Pakistani side Mr Jinnah, the Governor General, andLiaquatAliKhan,thePrime_Minister,alsosawinthe Kashmir crisis evidence of a conspiracy. They believed that the situation had been so engineered by the Indians, whose puppet they thought Mountbatten to be, as to provide the excuse for Kashmir’s accession to India beneath a defensive umbrella of Indian forces. Jinnah’s immediate reaction on hearing of the arrival of Sikh battalion at Srinagar was to order General Gracey, acting Commander-in-Chief of Pakistan Army, to send in his troops. Here Pakistan was at a real disadvantage. The armies of India and Pakistan were at that moment still under the same supreme command. Since 27 October and Indian acceptance of Kashmir’s accession it was clear that Pakistani action against Kashmir would be against India also…supreme commander, Auchinleck, would not agree to what amounted to an inter-Dominion war. Gracey was instructed to tell Jinnah that if Pakistan regulars went into Kashmir, all British officers would have to resign from the Pakistan Army…. with the onset of the winter of 1947-8 the military situation in Kashmir was fast approaching a stalemate, the State being effectively cut in two by an elastic but impenetrable battlefront. It was at this juncture, on 31 December 1947, that Pandit Nehru referred the Kashmir dispute to the Chairman of the Security Council of the United Nations by way of the Indian Delegation at Lake Success.”
Referring to Prime minister Nehru’s commitment to let Kashmiri people decide their fate, the author observes: “In his broadcast [2 November 1947] Nehru announced that ‘We have decided that the fate of Kashmir is ultimately to be decided by the people. That pledge we have given, and the Maharaja has supported it, not only to the people of Kashmir but to the world. We will not, and cannot back out of it. We are prepared when peace and law and order have been established to have a referendum held under international auspices like the United Nations. We want it to be a fair and just reference to the people, and we shall accept their verdict. I can imagine no fairer and juster offer.’…”
In the fourth chapter (Kashmir and the United Nations, 1947 to 1964) discussing the role of the UN, the author observes: “It was the Indian side which first brought Kashmir to the Security Council…Pakistan, however, raised a much more fundamental issue. Kashmir, so Zafrullah Khan said, was part of a wider Indian project for the very suppression of Pakistan itself. The Kashmir accession to India, which India accepted, was compared to Junagadh's accession to Pakistan, which India had set aside. In both cases, it was pointed out, the ruler was of a different religion to his subjects, Kashmir with Hindu rule over Muslims and Junagadh the precise opposite. Pakistan accused India of fraud, oppression, even genocide in the attempt to prevent and then undo partition. In the Kashmir case, Pakistan requested that the Security Council set up a Commission which would arrange for a ceasefire in Kashmir…”
In the fifth chapter (Inside Kashmir 1947 to 1965) presenting an account of the Indian politics inside Kashmir, the author observes: “The precise nature of the relationship between Kashmir and India was certainly rather vague, calling for further definition. This fact was recognized in Article 370 of the Indian Constitution, which was entitled ‘Temporary provisions’ with respect to the State of Jammu and Kashmir…The Indian authorities in New Delhi no doubt felt that eventually Kashmir would become just another Indian State, but that in view of the crisis then prevailing in the State and the interest taken in it by the United Nations, it would be as well not to proceed to any final arrangement at this juncture. It would seem that this attitude was not shared by Sheikh Abdullah, who had no desire to find his Government swallowed by the Indian Republic…”
Reflecting on the removal of Sheikh Abdullah from government, the author states: “In August 1953, when Sheikh Abdullah was away from Srinagar, his close associate Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed arranged for his dismissal by the Head of State… [who became] Prime Minister in his place….With Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed in power, Kashmir started drifting steadily into the Indian orbit…In October 1963 the reign of Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed came to an end…He was succeeded by Khwaja Shamsuddin. Just before his departure, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed announced proposed changes in the State's constitution… in order to bring the State's constitution more in line with the constitutions of other Indian States...The threat of these changes certainly tended towards a deterioration in lndo-Pakistani relations which wasfurther aggravated by the crisis which broke out in Srinagar…On 26 December 1963 it was discovered that a sacred relic, a hair which was believed to have come from the head of the Prophet Muhammed [pbuh], had been stolen from the Hazratbal shrine near Srinagar… on 3 January 1964, the relic was mysteriously returned to the Hazratbal Shrine…By the end of October 1964 lndo-Pakistani relations over Kashmir began to revert to their habitual state of acrimony, the momentum of the spring thaw having dwindled away after Nehru'sdeathinaseriesoffruitlessexchangesbetweenPresident Ayub and Mr Shastri. By December it seemed certain the Indian Government, far from resolving to talk about Kashmir with Pakistan, had decided to advance one stage further the integration of the State within the Indian Union…”
In the sixth chapter (Plebiscite and the Cold War, 1947 to 1957) presenting accounts of UN efforts and India and Pakistan positions on solving the Kashmir issue, the author observes: “The attempts by the United Nations to find a solution to the Kashmir dispute, and the process of evolution in the internal politics of the divided state were accompanied by a series of direct Indo-Pakistani discussions which offered, and still offer the only real hope for a final settlement…Nehru was hoping to make the plebiscite less attractive in Karachi…”
In the seventh chapter (China and the Road to War, 1957 to 1965) commenting on Nehru’s role in Kashmir, the author observes: “…by May 1964 Pandit Nehru, who had become a much changed man in the years following the Indian debacle under Chinese attack in late 1962…We will, however, never really know what lay in Pandit Nehru's mind at this time. On 27 May 1964 he died…The passing of Pandit Nehru, we can now see, doomed to failure any attempts at this time to settle the Kashmir dispute…”
Pointing out the Indian attempts to integrate Kashmir into the Indian union, the authors states: “By December there were unmistakable signs emanating from New Delhi and Srinagar that a further stage in the integration of Jammu and Kashmir State into the Indian Republic was about to begin. On 4 December 1964 the Government of India announcedthat Articles 356 and 357 of the Indian Constitution, which related to the establishment in certain cases of Presidential rule and to the scope of Indian Parliamentary legislation, would now be applied to Kashmir. It seemed probable that soon Article 370 of the Constitution would be abrogated, thus completing once and for all the accession of Kashmir to India…”
In chapter eight (The Rann of Kutch, War and Tashkent, 1965 to 1966), discussing the status of Kashmir, the author observes: “…President Ayub had three choices before him. First, he could continue along the welltrodden path of appeals to the Security Council to bring about a plebiscite. Second, he could try to let Kashmir drop gently out of public view, accepting tacitly that the 1949 ceasefire line would be forever the Indo-Pakistani border. Third, he could seek other means, diplomatic, political and military, to force some settlement….While by the beginning of 1965 the Indian attitude to Kashmir had hardened to a point which made compromise seem most unlikely, yet there were factors in the situation within India which suggested that pressure might yield dividends …Pakistan entered the conflict [1965] …members of SEATO made it clear to Z. A. Bhutto, Foreign Minister of Pakistan, that they could not in any way be involved in the Indo-Pakistani conflict…There can be little doubt that Lal Ba Shastri's greatest contribution to world peace was made very moment of his death. The Tashkent Declaration of 10 January 1966 did not deal with the Kashmir dispute other than to note its existence.”
In chapter nine (Conclusion and prospects), concluding the book, the author observes: “The Tashkent declaration did not, of course, mark the end of the Kashmir problem. Indeed, by mid-1966 India and Pakistan appeared to be no nearer agreement than they had been in 1949 when the first cease-fire was signed. Popular opinion in both Pakistan and India was vehemently opposed to any concessions on Kashmir. Pakistan was still committed to the demand for a plebiscite. India still maintained that there no longer existed a Kashmir problem at all…By 1967 or 1968, whatever Lal Bahadur Shastri or hissuccessor Mrs Indira Gandhi might say, there was a very real possibility that India would be an embryonic nuclear power. Kashmir would then stand in the terrible shadow of the mushroom cloud.
Dispute contained within it a challenge to both the Indian Union and the Islamic State of Pakistan…It must be admitted, however, that the challenge was greater to Pakistan than to India. While India produced impressive arguments in support of its case, one cannot escape the feeling that all too often they were not the real arguments upon which she operated, and that she was in the last resort inspired by a desire to undo partition than to preserve her own union. There were graver threats to theIndianUnionthanKashmir, threats whichtheIndian leadership, obsessed with Kashmir, failed to meet in time. India’s conduct of Kashmir dispute, as the events of the first three months of 1966 make clear enough, has not served to strengthen the Indian Union; and it may be argued it would have been very much in India’s interests to have settled the dispute long ago, even if by doing so it was necessary to reaffirm the right of Pakistan to exist as an Islamic State. If there is ever to be peace in the subcontinent, India must participate in such declaration…This is the real meaning of the plebiscite in Kashmir. Not only would it involve the right of the people of Kashmirto decide their own future, but, by implication, it would be a reaffirmation of the right ofPakistan to exist at all…Indian statesmen and diplomats have been continually questioning the validity of partition. They deny, for instance, that Pakistan is a successor State to the British Raj. It is, they say, a new State. Somehow, the implication is clear enough, the British Raj in its Indian Republican reincarnation lost territory in 1947 to an alien Power. In other words, at the time of independence there was a kind of repetition of the periodic phenomenon of Indian history, an invasion of foreigners from the north-west…Pakistan is still tied to its demand for a plebiscite for the entire State,So long, however, as India argues that by virtue of the Maharaja's accession in 1947 the whole of Jammu and Kashmir State belongs by right to India, Pakistan has no option but, likewise, to treat the State as a single entity…”
In The Kashmir Problem: A Historical Survey (1947-1966), Alastair Lamb has provided a factual account of a historical conflict that may ultimately threaten the peace of the world. The book is an essential reading for students of history.

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