Book & Author
Mohammad Ayub Khan: Friends not Masters — A Political Autobiography
By Dr Ahmed S. Khan
Chicago, IL
“People in developing countries seek assistance, but on the basis of mutual respect; they want to have friends not masters.” - Mohammed Ayub Khan, President of Pakistan
Field Marshal Muhammad Ayub Khan (May 14, 1907 – April 19, 1974), was the Commander-in-Chief of army, who rose to power through a coup d’état in 1958, and later served as the second president of Pakistan until 1969 when country-wide protests led to his resignation.
In Friends not Masters — A Political Autobiography, President Muhammad Ayub Khan narrates his story — in twelve chapters — growing up in a small village in the northwest part of British India, attending Aligarh University, receiving military training at Sandhurst in UK, serving in British-Indian Army before and after World War II, helping refugees during the creation of Pakistan, becoming commander-in-chief of Pakistan army, staging the coup of 1958 (The Revolution) and imposing martial law, serving as the President of Pakistan, dealing with the political and military changes viz a viz foreign affairs, developing the constitution, and holding the presidential elections of 1965.
The author has dedicated two chapters discussing foreign affairs and his interaction with global leaders like US President Kennedy, Premier of Soviet Union Mr Kosygin, Indian Premier Mr Nehru, and others. The major themes covered by the author deal with the development of Pakistan viz a viz modernization and stability. The book was published in 1967 by Oxford University Press. The Urdu translation of the book was published under the title Jiss Rizk Say Aatey Ho Pervaaz MaiN Kootahey.
In the preface, the author describes the format of the book thus: “This is essentially a spoken book. After I had defined the broad scope and outlines of the book I asked some friends to prepare questions on the theme of different chapters. The question-and-answer sessions began in June 1964 and continued till the end of the year. The tape-recordings of these sessions came to nearly thirty hours and the transcript covered more than 900 pages. I got the transcript some time in 1965… The narrative covers events up to the Presidential Elections in 1965, though there are references to later events particularly in the chapter relating to Foreign Affairs. This history is still in the making but I think it has taken a positive direction and a stage has been reached from where one can look back and see an integrated picture... I have tried to keep the narrative candid and objective, concentrating on problems and events rather than on personalities… In dealing with world affairs, I have viewed problems as an Asian… A number of fateful events have taken place since 1965. I have not dealt with them in this volume because some of the events are too much a part of the present to permit a dispassionate interpretation at this time… FIELD MARSHAL MOHAMMAD AYUB KHAN, RAWALPINDI 28 February 1967.”
Describing his early memories and his father, the author observes: “My father had had four children by his first wife, who died, and I was the first child by his second wife. Rehana is a picturesque little village about fifty miles north of Rawalpindi in West Pakistan. It is surrounded by an undulating range of low hills, with the pine-covered slopes of the Himalayas in the distance … My father was a deeply religious man. He never missed his prayers and would say his tahajjud regularly. I remember once waking up in the middle of the night. I could feel his tall figure, standing by my bed, his head bowed in prayer. I knew he was praying for me, but I did not stir in my bed lest I should disturb him.”
Remembering his mother and father, the author states: “My mother was a simple woman who spent all her life in the village. She continued to live in our modest ancestral home till her death, doing whatever she could do to help the village folk. She was a strong-willed person and remained mentally alert till the last…While I was deeply attached to my mother, it was my father who had the greatest influence of all on my character, outlook, and attitude towards life. He was a Risaldar Major in Hodson's Horse. Physically he was a powerful man; his presence in the village would inspire awe and respect. But I remember him as a friend, extremely gentle, pious, and affectionate.”
Commenting on his early education, the author writes: “I was not a very bright student, nor did I find studies a particularly absorbing occupation. I loved outdoor life. A relative of mine kept hawks and dogs and that was excuse enough for me to slip away from school to look after his hawks. The result was that I failed in my tests in the sixth class when I was eleven years old. My father discovered what had been going on and gave me a sound thrashing, after which it became easier to attend to my studies….”
Describing his arrival at Aligarh, the author observes: “As soon as he [father] heard that I had passed my matriculation examination, in 1922, he told me to go to Aligarh. He was in such a hurry that he sent me a month before the university opened… I began to develop a great affection for the people and the institution. Aligarh was unique in many respects. I found there boys from all parts of India, Iran, and the African countries. They were drawn from widely differing social backgrounds and they spoke different dialects and languages; but they all had to learn to adjust themselves to the atmosphere of Aligarh.”
Remembering his days at Sandhurst, the author states: “There was a sizable community of Indian cadets at Sandhurst at that time and we clung to one another. Somehow, we all sensed that we were regarded as an inferior species. The British did not practice the color bar in a blatant manner, as in some countries, but they were no less color conscious. In those days anyone coming from a subject race was regarded as an inferior human being and this I found terribly galling. The tragedy of belonging to a subject race depressed us more poignantly in the free air of England. My relations with the British remained formal, by and large…At Sandhurst I was the first foreign cadet to be promoted Corporal and given two stripes…I did fairly well in my examinations and passed about 60th in a class of 123 cadets. One is judged by one's overall performance and power of command. I was first among the Indian cadets, this may well have been due to the distinction of being a corporal.”
Expounding on the communal riots of partition, the author observes: “With almost no warning the horrors of communal rioting burst upon us. The communal situation in Punjab deteriorated rapidly. After the Viceroy's announcement of the Partition Plan on 3 June 1947 there was some slight improvement. But the Sikhs soon started a vigorous agitation against the notional division of the Punjab described in the Plan. They were hoping to form a separate State of their own after driving out the Muslims from Sikh areas. On Tuesday 22 July 1947 members of the Partition Council decided to set up a Special Military Command from 1 August, to protect the population of Sialkot, Gujranwala, Sheikhupura, Lyallpur, Montgomery, Lahore, Amritsar, Gurdaspur, Hoshiarpur, Jullundur, Ferozepur, and Ludhiana — civil districts of the Punjab covering in all over 29,000 square miles…The agitation launched by the Sikhs suddenly took a violent and dangerous turn according to a premeditated program. The Sikhs had a well-trained organization which attacked the Muslims and drove them out towards Pakistan by moving flying columns of armed men from one district to another. The first clash occurred on 4 August 1947 at Majithia in Amritsar district. Two Muslim villages were surrounded and burnt to ashes and a large number of people were killed…All human qualities seemed to have been snuffed out and the whole edifice of culture and civilization crumbled during these terrible weeks. My faith in human nature was shaken and I used to ask myself; 'what can one do to stop this madness?' With great difficulty I managed to rescue a number of Muslims from Amritsar and elsewhere…I sent a message to the new Prime Minister of Pakistan, Liaquat Ali Khan, that we might have over a million refugees. I pleaded for the setting up of some central authority to organize refugee camps. No one realized at that time that the number of refugees would go up to eight or nine million.”
Commenting on the foreign policy, the author states: “Nobody gives you freedom: you have to fight for it. Nobody fights for you: you have to fight for yourself. Pakistan's foreign policy has a deep moral content. It is inspired by a consciousness of the equality of all nations and the right of all peoples to govern themselves according to their ideology. The principal objectives of Pakistan's foreign policy are security and development. The consideration of security embraces the defense of our country and the preservation of our ideology.”
Expounding further on foreign policy, the author states: “From the day of Independence Pakistan was involved in a bitter and prolonged struggle for her existence and survival. By 1954 Pakistan was compelled to align herself with the West in the interests of her security. She became a member of the Baghdad Pact [later CENTO] and the South-East Asia Treaty Organization [SEATO], both of which were suspect in the communist world…India had built up massive military strength by acquiring arms from the Soviet Union as well as from some Western countries. She had consolidated her hold over the occupied area of Jammu and Kashmir by establishing a reign of terror: most of the Kashmiri leaders were languishing in jail and all civil liberties had been completely suppressed. The United Nations no longer seemed interested in having its own Resolutions, to which both India and Pakistan were pledged in honor, implemented so as to give the people of Jammu and Kashmir a free and fair opportunity to determine their future. We had few contacts or dealings with the communist world. The Soviet Union regarded us with suspicion and distrust as some kind of a camp-follower of the United States. With the People's Republic of China, we were on terms merely of nodding acquaintance.”
Referring to relations with the United States, China and Soviet Union, the author observes: “We must be able to explain to the United States the extent to which we could go along with them without compromising our own interests. It is not in our interest to alienate the People's Republic of China. Similarly, it is in our interest to develop normal and friendly relations with the Soviet Union. It should be possible to convince the United States that our relations with the People's Republic of China or with the Soviet Union are not directed against American interests in Asia.”
Expounding on India’s neutral stance during the Cold War era, the author observes: “India's neutralism was at best a posture of sitting on the fence and seeing how best it could take advantage of both sides; at worst it was a kind of sanctimonious hypocrisy and a subterfuge. For a time, India could get away with it because of its size and strategic position in Asia. India's `neutralism' was an attempt to act 'big' and to create a cover for the expansion of her influence. We entertain no such illusions…Conflicts between nations cannot remain isolated. Should a conflict take place between India and Pakistan other powers will inevitably get drawn into it. But we must develop the capacity and the will to stay the course regardless of what the others may or may not do.”
Describing the issue of Kashmir, the author observes: “There is the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan Resolution dealing with the Jammu and Kashmir dispute, to which both India and Pakistan are parties. Yet every time an attempt is made to implement the Resolution, India finds one pretext or another to frustrate it. First, she said that conditions in Jammu and Kashmir must be allowed to become normal before the people could be given an opportunity to exercise their right of self-determination. And when conditions returned to normal, she said that now that the situation had settled down matters should not be disturbed by ascertaining the wishes of the people. This has been the constant pattern of Indian policy: 'Let things become normal and we will deal with the problem'; and 'now that things are normal why raise the problem'.”
Remembering his meeting with President Kennedy, the author states: “In my meetings with President Kennedy I tried to impress upon him that the situation in the sub-continent could not become stable so long as India and Pakistan remained on inimical terms over Kashmir... President Kennedy agreed with me that there was an urgent need for a solution of the Kashmir problem.”
Commenting on US arms assistance to India during the Indo-China conflict, and the issue of Kashmir, the author states: “Obviously, the United States government had ignored two very important points, that their decision to give arms aid to India was arrived at without prior consultation with Pakistan; and it was communicated to India before it was communicated to Pakistan…It was also clear that while the United States wanted to see an amicable settlement of the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan, they were not prepared to use their full influence directly lest India should feel that she was being subjected to pressure. The US attitude, in fact, was that India should have all sympathy and support and that Pakistan would be well advised not to raise any difficulties.”
Commenting on relations with Arab states, the author states: “While Pakistan has always supported Arab causes, and the UN records are available to prove this, Pakistanis have reason to feel aggrieved that they do not always get support from the Muslim world in their own struggle.”
Expounding on grand designs of India, the author observes: “The Indian theoreticians were claiming boundaries from the Oxus to Mekong. We could not attribute everything to the imperialists. India was not content with her present sphere of influence, and she knew that Pakistan had the will and the capacity to frustrate her expansionist designs. She wanted to browbeat us into subservience. All we wanted was to live as equal and honorable neighbors, but to that India would never agree. It was Brahmin chauvinism and arrogance that had forced us to seek a homeland of our own where we could order our life according to our own thinking and faith.”
Remembering his interaction with Soviet leaders, the author observes: “Mr Kosygin then said that perhaps the United States was trying to take advantage of Sino-Soviet differences. But the US should know that these differences would not stand in the way of the Soviet Union coming to the help of the Vietnamese… Mr Kosygin said 'that you were a member of certain pacts—even though paper pacts—and we were doubtful and cautious about you.' I think there was general recognition on both sides that the meeting might prove a turning point in our relations and that there were tremendous possibilities of cooperation. I found the Soviet leaders extremely knowledgeable. They were courteous, polite, and hospitable but firm on their basic assumptions. I venture to think that they recognized our sincerity and came to have a better appreciation of our position. During my visit to the Soviet Union, I was also able to get a better understanding of the nature of the Sino-Soviet differences.”
President Muhammad Ayub Khan concludes the book with an appeal to the people: “I appealed to the nation to work for the fulfilment of the ideology of Pakistan. `Together let us build, together let us accomplish; so that Pakistan shall endure and prosper.' PAKISTAN. PAINDABAD.”
Friends not Masters — A Political Autobiography shines light on the life and times of President Muhammed Ayub Khan. The book offers candid views of the author on an array of topics related to geo-politics and the development and governance of Pakistan. It is beneficial for general readers, and students of history, international affairs and political science. (Dr Ahmed S. Khan - dr.a.s.khan@ieee.org - is a Fulbright Specialist Scholar -2017-2022)
