Book & Author
Henry Kissinger: Six Studies in World Strategy
By Dr Ahmed S. Khan
Chicago, IL
“Blessed are the people whose leaders can look destiny in the eye without flinching but also without attempting to play God.”
In Leadership: Six Studies in World Strategy, Henry Kissinger, former US Secretary of State — at age 99 concerned about lack of global leadership — pens his 19 th book to profile leaders who reshaped the world after WWII: Konrad Adenauer (West Germany), Charles de Gaulle (France), Richard Nixon (USA), Anwar Sadat (Egypt), Lee Kuan Yee (Singapore), and Margaret Thatcher (Great Britain). Kissinger has interacted with all of them in his capacities as National Security Adviser and US Secretary of State during Nixon and Ford presidencies. Henry Kissinger still has a sharp memory, remains highly active, and currently serves as the chairperson of his consulting firm — Kissinger Associates, Inc.
Kissinger 99 is the only living member of the Nixon cabinet and oldest living cabinet member of any administration. But he remains a controversial figure: his admirers hail him as champion and visionary of realpolitik and a true American success, and his opponents view him as an alleged war criminal responsible for the death of millions due to consequences of his policies.
Commenting on the importance of leadership, the author observes: “Any society, whatever its political system, is perpetually in transit between a past that forms its memory and a vision of the future that inspires its evolution. Along this route, leadership is indispensable: decisions must be made, trust earned, promises kept, a way forward proposed. Within human institutions — states, religions, armies, companies, schools — leadership is needed to help people reach from where they are to where they have never been and, sometimes, can scarcely imagine going. Without leadership, institutions drift, and nations court growing irrelevance and, ultimately, disaster.”
Expounding on the axes of leadership, the author notes: “Leaders think and act at the intersection of two axes: the first, between the past and the future; the second, between the abiding values and aspirations of those they lead. They must balance what they know, which is necessarily drawn from the past, with what they intuit about the future, which is inherently conjectural and uncertain. It is this intuitive grasp of direction that enables leaders to set objectives and lay down a strategy. For strategies to inspire the society, leaders must serve as educators —communicating objectives, assuaging doubts and rallying support.”
Discussing the importance of leadership during periods of transitions, the author states: “Leadership is most essential during periods of transitions, when values and institutions are losing their relevance, and the outlines of a worthy future are in controversy. In such times, leaders are called upon to think creatively and diagnostically: what are the sources of the society’s well-being? Of its decay? Which inheritances from the past should be preserved, and which adapted or discarded? Which objectives deserve commitment, and which prospects must be rejected no matter how tempting? And, at extreme, is one’s society sufficiently vital and confident to tolerate sacrifice as a waystation to a more fulfilling future?”
In an interview — published in USA Today on July 5, 2022, to coincide with the release of the book —commenting on the challenges faced by the six chosen leaders, Dr Kissinger observes: "The challenge for each of them was by conventional standards potentially overwhelming ... . The challenge was not exactly the same, but it was a challenge to the basic purposes of the society. And after a period of disappointment and non-fulfillment, they had the strength to develop a concept for how to overcome it, but also to take their people with them."
Commenting on the lack of leadership and need for new leaders, Dr Kissinger notes: "Of course, I worry that the leadership will not emerge, partly because the nature of information has so changed that the daily impact of events overrides reflection about its meaning. And to manage the daily flow of events, it's so time-consuming. But on the other hand, the way these issues did get handled, it's that somebody or some group emerges that believes there is some transcendent aspect and that the public then says, 'That's what we really wanted.' ... I count on the fact that some leadership will emerge to do this."
Reflecting on the most astounding leader he profiles in the book, Kissinger states: “The most remarkable case, de Gaulle, arriving (when France fell to Germany in 1940) as the lowest-ranking general in the French army in London, in fact, having just been appointed general two weeks earlier, not speaking the language, not having any place whatsoever and becoming within three weeks, leader of the Free French. And (British Prime Minister Winston) Churchill saying to him, 'You are alone, and I'm alone. So, we might as well work together.' But then he didn't speak of defeat. He spoke of transcending almost the century of decline for the French state and rebuilding France on that basis. Of all these leaders, I think it was the most astounding."
Reminiscing about the leader he underestimated, Kissinger observes: “Sadat sent an emissary before the (1973 Yom Kippur) war. I had two meetings with him, one in a private house in Westchester County, and another one in Paris, or near Paris, while I was on a European trip. And in each case, I outlined our concept to him. And in each case, they rejected it – 'they' being Sadat. And I have to confess, I thought so little of Sadat that when the emissary at the end of his presentation said, 'If this meeting works well, the president will invite you to Cairo.' And I wrote a note to (my assistant) Peter Rodman, who was sitting next to me, 'Would it be impolite to ask him what the second prize is?'...Sadat sent a message on the second day of the war that he wanted to negotiate after the war. And I'd sent him a message saying, 'During the war, please keep in mind that you are fighting it with Soviet arms, but you will have to make peace through American diplomacy.' So those were sort of the ground rules. But when I actually met him, it was two weeks later.... And he began the conversation by saying, 'I want peace. And I want a Kissinger plan.' And he said, 'Since you were not unavailable, I made a Kissinger plan.' And he went to a map and showed me.... That willingness to go step-by-step, rather than seek an overall settlement, was a breakthrough.”
Expounding on handling the crush of information viz a viz the rise of technologies and the failure of bipartisanship, Kissinger observes: “The daily impact of events overrides reflection about its meaning.” Kissinger seeing parallels between the challenges of the Nixon era and today’s world, observes: “Once again, it is a tale first of exuberant confidence generating overextension and then of overextension giving birth to debilitating self-doubt…once again, in almost every region of the world, the United States confronts major interlocking challenges to both its strategies and its value. That has led to ‘renewed potential for catastrophic confrontation.’” In his interview with USA Today, Kissinger states: “The present age is unmoored. The challenges now are ‘a little bit worse than it was then,’ because then our critics were part of the same system…. What is happening now is — the debate is about the worthiness of America, whether America and what kind of America is worth it to conduct policy. That makes the dialogue even harder than it was then in terms of our internal debate.”
The author begins the first leadership profile by reflecting on Konrad Adenauer’s strategy of humility: “Adenauer's first public speech after the end of the war on March 26, 1946, was a preview of his subsequent political leadership. Criticizing Germany's conduct under Hitler, Adenauer asked an audience of thousands in the severely damaged main hall of the University of Cologne how it was possible that the Nazis had come to power. They had then committed 'great crimes', he said, and the Germans could find their way toward a better future only by coming to terms with their past. Such an effort would be necessary for their country's revival. From this perspective, Germany's attitude after the Second World War needed to be the opposite of its reaction to the First. Instead of indulging in self-pitying nationalism once again, Germany should seek its future within a unifying Europe. Adenauer was proclaiming a strategy of humility.”
Commenting on Adenauer’s leadership traits, the author notes: “Tall and seemingly imperturbable, Adenauer tended to speak tersely, though mitigated by the lilting tones of the Rhineland, more conciliatory than Prussian speech, in which, according to Mark Twain, sentences march across conversations like military formations. (The Rhineland had had an autonomous history until it was acquired by Prussia in 1814-15.) At the same time, he exuded vitality and self-assurance. His style was the antithesis of the blaring charismatic quality of the Hitler era and aspired to the serene authority of the pre-First World War generation, which had operated while governed by restraint and shared values. All of these qualities, together with the standing he had acquired by a decade of ostentatious aloofness from Hitler, made Adenauer the most obvious candidate to lead the new democratic party. But he was not above practical maneuvers to achieve his end. The first CDU meeting was set up with one chair positioned at the head of the table. Adenauer strode up to it and announced, 'I was born on 5 January 1876, so I am probably the oldest person here. If nobody objects, I will regard myself as president by seniority.' That elicited both laughter and acquiescence; from that point on, he would steward the party for over fifteen years.”
Kissinger calls Margaret Thatcher a dear friend and praises her policies viz a viz cold war stance, Falkland war and dealings with the IRA. Out of the six leaders, Kissinger admires De Gaulle the most and presents a profile of him as a leader who believed in total self-belief and confidence in most challenging circumstances. The author observes: “On every major strategic question facing France and Europe over no fewer than three decades, and against an overwhelming consensus, De Gaulle judged correctly.”
Kissinger’s political outlook emphasizes the concept of strategy viz a viz national interest and power politics. He paints a sympathetic portrait of President Nixon, hailing his foreign policy initiatives to develop relations with China, détente with the soviet union , and shuttle diplomacy in the middle east to contain the soviet union, and to pull US out of the Vietnam war to achieve peace by bombing Cambodia without mentioning the wave of death and destruction that followed. Regarding the Watergate scandal during President Nixon’s second term, in his interview with the USA Today, Kissinger notes: "I think it was a tragedy. It was a stupidity. I don't really think Nixon ordered it (the break-in), but he created the conditions out of which it grew. The Watergate itself was a petty transgression, but the obstruction of justice by the president, that cannot be. That was the reason why he fell."
Kissinger's profile of Richard Nixon mainly revolves around the war in Vietnam. He credits Nixon and himself for avoiding a global war over the 1971 India-Pakistan conflict that created Bangladesh, as he observes “the maintenance of an appropriate international equilibrium”. Many historians hold Kissinger responsible for his role in the dismemberment of Pakistan, and some still recall his famous threat to Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. Kissinger's power-based policies for geo-politics resulted in many messy outcomes. But during 1971 Pakistan-India conflict Kissinger policies failed to prevent the dismemberment of the key cold-war, SEATO & CENTO ally Pakistan — whom the US leadership regarded as the frontline state, and to the Chinese it was their ‘Iron Brother.’ In retrospect Kissinger out-smarted clueless Pakistani leadership who were busy basking in self-praise and glory for acting as a bridge to China — but in the end their efforts did not pay any dividends.
Discussing the role of superpowers, Dr. Safdar Mahmood, in his book, Pakistan Divided has observed: “Henry Kissinger has himself admitted that the ‘USA favored political autonomy for East Bengal’ and that ‘East Pakistan was gone in any case’, It is, therefore, obvious that the US sympathized with the Bengali autonomous movement and had no intention to interfere with the surrender.” Kissinger in the book acknowledges that the United States recognized Bangladesh within four months of the ceasefire.
G.W. Choudhury, a cabinet member of General Yahya, in his book The Last Days of United Pakistan had observed: “The most immediate factor was Henry Kissinger's secret trip to Peking via Rawalpindi. Further, Kissinger was reported to have told the Indian ambassador in Washington after his visit to Peking that China would ‘intervene’ if India attacked Pakistan, and the United States might not come to India's help as it had done in 1962 and 1965, when it had warned China against intervention. This caused consternation in India, as her plan to dismember Pakistan by direct military intervention was placed in grave danger by the so-called ‘Sino-US détente’. Siri[n] Gupta of Nehru University, New Delhi, wrote: ‘However great the reluctance of the Indian optimists to admit it, the fact is that the Sino-US rapprochement has altered the international context in which India has to conduct its local struggles and that on the specific issue of Bangladesh, the entire weight of this development can be thrown against our country.’ ‘ This led India to sign the treaty with the Soviet Union which had been in preparation for more than two years — since Brezhnev had spelt out his scheme for a collective Asian security system. Though termed the treaty of ‘peace, friendship and co-operation’, a closer scrutiny of the text leaves no doubt as to its military emphasis — it was a disguised military pact. Once the Indians got the umbrella of protection by a super-power against any potential Chinese threat in her military adventures against Pakistan to ‘solve’ the Bangladesh crisis, their war preparations began in earnest. Simultaneously the trained Indians joined the Mukti Bahini in military operations in East Bengal. The destruction of bridges and sinking of Pakistani ships at the port of Chittagong could not have been done by the inexperienced Mukti Bahini. There was evidence of growing involvement by trained personnel of the Indian armed forces in these destructive activities in East Bengal.”
During the 1971 conflict people and leaders in Pakistan thought — very naively — that their friends, the US and China will come to their help in war against India, forgetting Kissinger’s observations: “America has no permanent friends or enemies, only interests.” So, neither the seventh fleet came nor the promised Chinese intervention, and the two powers — for their own geo-political interests and gains — let their key ally be chopped up by the Soviet-India defense pact. Pakistan with its West and East wings had a large geo-political foot-print — that was unacceptable to regional and global powers. Lack of effective leadership also played a key role in the fall of East Pakistan. Unfortunately, Pakistani leaders have not learned any lessons from the 1971 debacle — ‘General Yahyaegoistic mindset’ still persists attenuating the emergence of potential future leadership for the progress of the country.
Lee Kuan Yew’s dynamic and visionary leadership has transformed Singapore from a muddy Island into a 21st Century economic powerhouse. His economic model continues to be emulated around the globe. Expounding on Lee Kuan Yew’s leadership, the author notes: “Most significantly, Lee’s statesmanship illustrates that the best determinants of a society’s fate are neither its material wealth nor other conventional measures of power but rather the quality of its people and the vision of its leaders. As Lee said, ‘If you are just realistic, you become pedestrian, plebeian, you will fail. Therefore, you must be able to soar above the reality and say, ‘This is also possible.’”
The author concludes the book by observing: “Great leadership results from the collision of the intangible and the malleable, from that which is given and that which is exerted. Scope remains for individual effort — to deepen historical understanding, hone strategy and improve character. The Stoic philosopher Epictetus wrote long ago, 'We cannot choose our external circumstances, but we can always choose how we respond to them.' It is the role of leaders to help guide that choice and inspire their people in its execution.”
In Leadership: Six Studies in World strategy (Penguin Press, July 5, 2022), Henry Kissinger analyzes the strategies of six important 20 th century personalities and sums up common traits of their triumphs as a model for effective leadership and successful diplomacy. The book is a valuable resource; all students of history, international relations, and stakeholders of realpolitik will benefit greatly by Kissinger’s advice and insights on leadership and diplomacy.
Dr Ahmed S. Khan ( dr.a.s.khan@ieee.org ) is a Fulbright Specialist Scholar.
