Book & Author
Hal Brands & Michael Beckley: Danger Zone — The Coming Conflict with China
By Dr Ahmed S. Khan
Chicago, IL
Recently it has appeared as conventional wisdom that the US and China are competing in a superpower marathon which may last a century. The relations between the US and China were already at a nadir before the American fighter jets shot down Chinese surveillance balloons — some people have proclaimed that this act has triggered the start of a new cold war. CNN’s analysis titled ‘Why the Chinese balloon crisis could be a defining moment in the new Cold War," states that "The Chinese balloon saga threatens to be a watershed moment in the world's dangerous new superpower rivalry: For the first time, Americans experienced a tangible symbol of the national security challenge from Beijing."
During the past couple of years two types of books representing US-China relations have been published — the first group focused on the past — discussing various economic, political and social conditions that existed in China during the last four decades, and — the second group highlighted the future — exploring the geopolitical, economic competition and conflict between the US and China. Danger Zone — The Coming Conflict with China by Hal Brands and Michael Beckley belongs to the second group.
Hal Brands is the Henry Kissinger Distinguished Professor at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies and a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. Michael Beckley is associate professor of political science at Tufts University and a non-resident senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.
In Danger Zone the authors analyzing the US-China rivalry — based on geopolitical interests, ideological differences in form of governance and economic interests — pose a counterintuitive question: "What if the sharpest phase of this competition is more like a decade-long sprint?” The authors believe that considering the history and China's present trajectory suggest that US-China rivalry will reach its peak danger in the 2020s and prospects for a war will be real. The authors observe that the greatest geopolitical catastrophes occur at the intersection of ambition and desperation, and that Xi Jinping's China will soon be driven by plenty of both; and the cause of desperation is a slowing economy coupled with a sense of encirclement and decline.
The authors argue that the US's military modernization upgrade — undertaken to meet the Chinese challenge — will not be completed until the 2030s. So, if China starts the conflict before that, the US will be at its biggest disadvantage. So, the authors call the next decade as the so-called “Danger Zone.” The authors draw historical parallels between the 2020s and the post-WWII era when the US enforced a stable balance of power with the Soviets. Reflecting on the early years of the cold war, the authors recommend a set of strategies to succeed in the coming decade of conflict.
The book has eight chapters: 1. The Chinese Dream 2. Peak China 3. The Closing Ring 4. Danger: Falling Powers 5. The Gathering Storm 6. What One Cold War Can Teach Us About Another 7. Into the Danger Zone, and 8. Life on the Other Side.
Expounding on the question, “Why write a book that warns about a coming conflict with China during a year in which Russia started a major war in Europe?” the authors note: “The simple answer is that Russian aggression in Ukraine has made the successful containment of China all the more imperative. If China were to follow in Russia's footsteps and expand violently in its region, Eurasia would be engulfed in conflict. The United States would again face the prospect of a two-front war, only this time against nuclear-armed aggressors fighting ‘back to back’ along their shared border. America's military would be overstretched and, likely, overwhelmed; America's alliance system might come under unbearable strain. The postwar international order could collapse as countries across Eurasia scramble to defend themselves and cope with the knock-on effects of major-power war, including economic crises and mass refugee flows. A world already shaken by Russian aggression could be shattered by a Chinese offensive.”
Answering the question further, the authors observe: “Another reason we focus on China is that it is especially dangerous. China's economy is ten times larger than Russia's, and Beijing's military budget is quadruple the size of Moscow's. Whereas Russia is essentially a two-dimensional great power that draws influence from its military and energy resources, China possesses a wider spectrum of coercive tools and can challenge the United States and its allies in almost any domain of geopolitical competition. Xi Jinping presides over the largest military and economy (measured by purchasing power parity) on the planet. Chinese officials occupy leadership positions in many of the world's major international institutions. More than half of the world's countries already trade more with China than with the United States; and China has recently become the world's largest overseas lender, doling out more credit than the World Bank, the IMF, or all twenty-two of the Paris Club governments (a group of the world's major lending nations) combined. Beijing's economic power may be peaking, but no other country is so capable of challenging America globally. As malevolent as an autocratic Russia is, the competition between Washington and Beijing is likely to be the defining geopolitical contest of our era. Failure to prevail in this struggle against a troubled but uniquely potent rival would have world-historical consequences.”
Reflecting on the objective of the book, the authors state: “This book offers a contrarian take on China by explaining why that country is in more trouble than most analysts think, why that trend makes the coming years so perilous, and how America can prepare for the storm that is about to strike. We also challenge the received wisdom about the origins of major war and the rise and fall of great powers…Massive, system-shaking wars are likeliest during a ‘power transition’—when a surging challenger overtakes an exhausted hegemon. These ideas date back to Thucydides, who wrote that it was the rise of Athens at the expense of Sparta that caused the Peloponnesian War…The anxiety caused by relative decline, not the confidence that comes from rising strength, can make ambitious powers erratic and violent. Finally, apocalyptic wars can occur even when power transitions do not: Once rising challengers have gone down fighting when they realized that they had provoked rivals they wouldn't otherwise catch. Understanding this deadly pattern from the past—call it the ‘peaking power trap’—is critical to preparing for a dark future that is unfolding faster than you might think.”
Reflecting on PLA strategy viz a viz India and other neighbors, the authors observe: “In late 1962, while the world was preoccupied with the Cuban Missile Crisis, China and India fought a major war resulting in a resounding Indian defeat. Since then, New Delhi and Beijing have continued to jockey for advantage, both in the eastern section of the border region, between Burma and Nepal, and in the western section between Nepal and Pakistan. In the years before 2020, the intensity of the dispute gradually ratcheted upward. In 2017, there was a prolonged military standoff after the PLA began building a strategically located road in territory claimed by Bhutan, which India views as a friendly buffer state. Even more brazenly, China surreptitiously constructed, on land globally recognized as Bhutanese, entire villages with an accompanying PLA presence. In 2019, there was a marked increase in Chinese violations of the de facto border with India. Throughout this period, there were also periodic clashes between Indian and Chinese patrols, governed by a long-standing set of implicit rules—no guns, no killing—that kept simmering tensions below a boil… Narendra Modi's nationalist government had more recently worried that Beijing was using BRI projects in Sri Lanka and Pakistan to pressure India from all sides. After Galwan, the backlash was sharp.”
In chapter titled “Into the Danger Zone,” discussing the strategies to contain China (called by Democratic and Republican administrations as the ‘defining danger’ of the 21 st century), the authors state: “‘Great-power competition’ and ‘long-term rivalry’ have become go-to catchphrases in DC policy circles; ‘marathon’ metaphors are ubiquitous. Biden himself put the issue in generational terms: Future historians ‘are going to be doing their doctoral thesis on the issue of who succeeded, autocracy or democracy.’ But if American officials now understand the stakes of the competition, they don't always grasp the urgency…”
Drawing on lessons learned from the Cold War, the authors claim that the coming cold war ‘is perhaps the best historical example of a successful danger-zone strategy’ that can be used to counter propaganda spread by CCP. The authors offer four insights: (1) prioritize ruthlessly; the US needs to determine where to bet big and how to conserve scarce resources (2) combine strategic purpose with tactical agility (3) use a little offense for best defense, and (4) think long term to ensure that game can be won.
In the final chapter titled “Life on the Other Side” discussing the perils of success, the authors observe: “America doesn’t have a plan. But when it does, the world gets remade. A US danger zone strategy will be no exception. It won’t preserve the world we know today. It will fundamentally alter the structure of world politics, and not entirely for the better. The good news is that these changes are fairly predictable. The bad news is that they essentially entail a new cold war. If America adopts a successful danger-zone strategy, China won’t establish the geographically dominant techno-bloc that give US officials nightmares. America’s digital coalition will be bigger, stronger, and well positioned to prevail in the end… As the technological world splinters, the consequences for ordinary people will be profound…when people travel from one bloc to another…they will enter a different digital world.”
Expounding on the “Going Long” strategy the authors outline ten principles: “One thing seems clear: Even after America exits the period of greatest risk; it probably won't enter a time of tranquility…Washington will need to shift gears in the 2030s from a danger-zone strategy to an approach that can last as long as the competition does. In making that transition, ten principles may be helpful. First, decide what victory looks like…Second, learn to pace yourself…Looking beyond the 2020s, Washington must find a sustainable strategy…Third, Sharp the rivalry by shaping the system…throwing China back will require lots of disruption — breaking supply chains, splitting the Internet, turning maritime East Asia into an armed camp… a fourth principle is that America must fight asymmetrically and impose costs relentlessly. The longer the rivalry goes, the more important it is to play to one's strengths and exploit the enemy's weaknesses… Fifth, continually invest in your key sources of strength. During the 2020s, Washington will be grabbing whatever tools it can find to break China's momentum…a sixth principle: Use a new era of global tension to ignite a new era of self-improvement. America's internal problems are real, and the United States won't profit from China's decline if the domestic foundations of its own power also collapse… Seventh, make negotiation a part of competition. The principles we've offered so far are meant to ensure that America can keep its edge over a declining but formidable power…An eighth point involves a counterintuitive approach to the unholy entente between Russia and China: Pushing your rivals together may be a prelude to pulling them apart. So long as Russia and China are on their current trajectories, with their current leadership, there probably isn't much the United States can do to induce a breakup. Trying to pull a ‘reverse Kissinger’—using clever diplomacy to peel Putin away from Xi, in imitation of the US opening to China during the 1970s—wouldn't work…a ninth point: Be ready to extend the olive branch. America won't succeed over a short or a long competition without exerting a lot of pressure. The United States must repeatedly frustrate Beijing's attempts at expansion; it must make China pay dearly for attempts to upend the status quo…”
The authors conclude the book by stating the final principle: “Be patient…getting through the danger zone requires an ethos of urgency and action…The long haul can be very long indeed… America’s task, in this decade, is to prevent a peaking China from imposing its will on the world. Yet strategic urgency must be followed by strategic patience. Washington’s reward for getting through the danger zone could be a ticket to a longer struggle in which America’s advantages prove decisive only over a generation or more. That may seem like a meager prize for a country that likes quick, decisive solutions. But it is surely worth winning, in view of the perils that America and the world confront today.”
Danger Zone is a well-researched work grounded in the history of World War II and Cold war; its main theme is that now China stands at the peak of power, relative to the US and its friends and allies. This reality is pushing China toward conflict, but it can also place China at a long-term disadvantage if the US makes it past the 2020s. The authors appear to be gung-ho about war over Taiwan, but fail to address key questions: Why did successive democratic and republican administrations fail to devise policies to prevent transfer of new and emerging technologies and high-tech jobs to China and India? How can the US regain its economic edge over China (during the 2001-2018 period the US lost close to 4 million jobs)?
Danger Zone — The Coming Conflict with China covers some bold and some exaggerated viewpoints on US-China relations viz a viz actions by the US to counter and defeat China’s global ambitions. However, the authors focus too much on defeating China militarily viz Taiwan and do not cover strategies for defeating China economically. The book is essential reading for students of history, international relations, business, and policy makers.
(Dr Ahmed S. Khan — dr.a.s.khan@ieee.org — is a Fulbright Specialist Scholar)
