Are Pakistanis
Fit for Democracy?
By Ahmad Faruqui, PhD
Danville, California
The
citizens of any country but Pakistan would take
umbrage at this question, but in Pakistan such
an anti-democratic view survives because it has
widespread support among the civilian elite. This
elite has connived with the military elite to
block democratic rule. These elites subscribe
to the Musharraf Doctrine, which was enunciated
by the general in an interview with the BBC on
the eve of George W. Bush’s visit.
Purveying a hackneyed argument, Musharraf argued
that a new definition of democracy was needed
for Pakistan, since one patterned after western
models would not work. Four decades ago, Field
Marshal Ayub Khan had put forward the concept
of “Basic Democracy” as being best
suited to the “genius” of the people
of Pakistan. Gen. Yahya held “free and fair”
elections but failed to transfer power to the
National Assembly, thereby precipitating the 1971
tragedy. And General Zia held sham party-less
parliamentary elections and a presidential referendum
to give him the fig leaf of democracy.
In the BBC interview, Musharraf claimed that he
had “introduced the essence of democracy”
in Pakistan by holding national, provincial and
local elections. Then he added, “none of
these things ever existed before,” confirming
his distaste for facts. The general went on to
say that the only objection anyone could have
to his democratic dispensation was that he continued
to be in uniform. This, he implied, was a specious
argument about a “label,” since constitutional
laws allowed him to wear the uniform until 2007.
The 24-hour visit of the American president concluded
with a press conference in which Bush urged Musharraf
to hold “open and honest” elections
because democracy was the way to defeat terrorism,
since it replaced an ideology of hatred with an
ideology of hope. Bush indicated that the two
men had spent “a lot of time discussing
democracy,” and expressed his belief that
it was Pakistan’s future. In the type of
tone that a parent uses to discipline a teenager,
Bush hammered home the point by saying that Musharraf
understood all of this.
Bush’s commentary was almost certainly not
a welcome development for Musharraf. No foreign
leader besides Bush would have dared make it,
either in or out of Pakistan, knowing that it
would stir up a diplomatic crisis. But it was
a long overdue statement that Bush owed to the
people of Pakistan.
The military elite that keeps Musharraf in power
remains deeply skeptical of the ability of politicians
to rule Pakistan. It has a dark conception of
democracy, which argues that Pakistan, despite
having been an independent state for 58 years,
is not ready for “full” democracy
and may never be ready for it. The view flows
from six flawed premises.
Firstly, that elected politicians have failed
to deliver political stability and economic progress.
This fatalistically presumes that all future elected
politicians will be similarly ineffective. Democratic
processes, when they are allowed to function without
military interference, will ultimately produce
strong civilian institutions and competent rulers.
The premise also overlooks the deep failings that
have characterized military rule, most notably
its lack of an exit strategy. All three prior
military rulers refused to relinquish their office
until the bitter end and were removed through
violent means.
Secondly, Pakistan cannot become a democracy until
it does away with its feudal character. This creates
a self-fulfilling prophecy. Every country that
is a democracy today was a feudal society at one
point, including Great Britain. It was the empowerment
of the people that led to the end of feudalism.
Thirdly, that Muslims don’t have a history
of democracy and the precepts of Islam prohibit
democracy. The first part is a non sequitur, since
much of the world, including Europe, was ruled
by absolute monarchies for centuries and does
not have a history of democracy. The second part
is not valid, since Islam calls for representative
government. It leaves open the definition of representativeness
to the consensus among the people and the scholars.
Fourthly, that “strong men” are necessary
to create the circumstances for democracy in developing
countries because law and order, education, and
economic development come before democracy. India
clearly contradicts this premise.
Fifthly, that Pakistan is composed of many ethnic
groups that can only be held together by military
rule. The fact is that military rule has exacerbated
Pakistan’s ethnic fault lines. A democratic
process will create a give-and-take attitude that
will smooth them over.
And, finally, that Pakistanis simply don’t
want democracy. This is contradicted by a survey
of some 2,000 Pakistanis carried out in 2000/01
in the four provinces by sociologists at the University
of Agriculture in Faisalabad. It found that 88
percent of Pakistanis agreed that democracy was
a “very good or fairly good” system
and only 4 percent agreed that military rule was
“very good or fairly good.”
Based on these premises, the anti-democratic civilian
and military elites have forged together a “coalition
of willing” that is blocking a return to
democracy, even though the people want it. This
coalition dreads what might happen if democracy,
as opposed to the Musharrafian essence, is restored.
The military elite supports this position because
it harnesses the rents that flow from running
all major institutions in the country and uses
them in part to buy off the civilian elite. It
markets “democracy in uniform” by
suggesting that “full” democracy would
result in a national meltdown, brought about by
ethnic warfare, sectarian strife, civilian corruption
and possibly a foreign invasion.
Such rent-seeking behavior by the military and
civilian elites has corroded Pakistan’s
national identity and is a form of strategic corruption
that is more sinister than individual financial
corruption. It explains why the democratic wave
that has swept the globe during the past two decades
has bypassed Pakistan. This wave has shattered
long-standing military holdouts in Eastern Europe
and Latin America. Closer to home, no army general
has ever come close to mounting a coup in New
Delhi, and it is virtually impossible to imagine
India ever being ruled by its generals. Even Bangladesh
has successfully managed to lose its martial law
inheritance.
Sharifuddin Peerzada, a confidante of the Quaid,
has given military rule a veneer of democracy
by citing the doctrine of necessity. Saying “necessity
knows no law,” C. S. Lewis counseled against
yielding to it because “it is under that
pretext that every abomination enters. Hitler,
the Machiavellian prince, the Inquisition, the
Witch Doctor, all claimed to be necessary.”
It is time for Peerzada to divulge those papers
of the Quaid in which he said that Pakistan was
unfit for democracy and envisaged its salvation
at the hands of uniformed rulers.
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